We integrate the literatures on exploration/exploitation and incentives, to examine how incentives impact individuals to explore new ideas or exploit existing ideas, as well as how this impact is dependent on the capabilities of individuals and peer-related performance comparisons. Further, we also investigate the implications of the change of incentives on exploration performance. We make use of micro-data on the commercial projects of sales employees at a South Korean e-commerce company to observe how a reduction in individual performance incentives shape the behavior of individuals to explore/exploit as well as their performance. We find that individuals engage in more exploration after a reduction in performance-based incentives, yet, interestingly, the increase in exploration is largely driven by highperforming individuals. Further, the increase in exploration recedes whenever individuals underperform their direct peers after the incentives reduction. Finally, exploration performance improves after the incentives change, and performance is particularly boosted for individuals who are working in complex task environments. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on exploration/exploitation by examining how individual behavior to explore or exploit is impacted by performance incentives and what are the moderating effects of this impact. We also contribute to the incentives literature by investigating the implications of incentives on innovation, and the heterogeneous effects of identical incentives on different individuals. Further, the study also provides insights into important micro-foundations of firm capabilities and performance.
INTRODUCTION
Firms need to continuously exploit existing knowledge in order to deliver short-term productivity (March, 1991) . At the same time, in order to stay innovative in the long-term, firms need to explore new knowledge and ideas (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991) . Indeed, prior literature has stressed the importance of balancing exploration and exploitation for sustained competitive advantage (He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) . Yet, tensions exist between the two activities, making their concurrent pursuit difficult (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) .
To address these tensions, prior literature has suggested to structurally separate organizational units to focus on either exploration or exploitation respectively (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) , or to vacillate between the two activities across the organization by sequencing them over time (Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003) .
Interestingly, while past studies have acknowledged and emphasized the role of the individual in exploration-exploitation activities (Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2004) , research on how such activities can be balanced at the individual-level, and how these activities can be strategically controlled by the organization has been scarce (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009) .
The scarcity of studies on these topics may be attributed to not only the lack of individual-level data, but also the theoretical assumptions that have been widely used in the literature. Gupta et al. explain that, "it would be difficult for an individual to develop routines to excel simultaneously at both exploration and exploitation. Further, given the substantial differences in routines and focus on learning, it may be very difficult to even switch between routines of exploration and exploitation (2006: 696) ." In recent years, however, several studies have made valuable progress in theorizing further and presenting empirical evidence that individuals can indeed engage in both activities (Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007; Mom et al., 2009; Rogan & Mors, 2014) , and also contribute to higher organizational performance by doing so (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) .
While the significance of these studies is undeniable, our understanding on how to motivate individuals to engage in both exploration and exploitation -particularly in ways that are conducive to the organization -remains incomplete (Gupta et al., 2006; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Raisch et al., 2009) .
In this regard, March (1991) points out one reason why individuals have difficulties in reaching optimal levels of exploration and exploitation is due to the lack of individual incentives to do so. In particular, he implies that motivating individuals to engage in exploration -a necessity for long-term organizational survival -is challenging, as the returns to exploration is often uncertain and temporally remote. In parallel to March's point, a significant stream of literature has provided evidence that incentives are one of the main factors motivating individual performance, particularly with regards to aligning their behavior with the firm's interest (Lazear, 2000; Prendergast, 1999 ). Yet, while substantial knowledge exists how incentives can affect productivity, little extant research exists on how incentives affect individual behavior to engage in targeted exploration or exploitation 2 . Further, incentives have also been shown to have complex and heterogeneous effects on different types of individuals (Chng, Rodgers, Shih, & Song, 2012; Frank & Obloj, 2014; Obloj & Sengul, 2012) , contingencies that we have yet to understand in the context of exploration and exploitation. Given the prevalence of incentive structures in firms, knowledge of these incentives and their heterogeneous affect is crucial.
In this paper, we integrate the literature on exploration and exploitation with the literature on incentives to address the gaps laid out above in either literature. Specifically, we examine how a reduction in performance-based incentive shapes individual behavior to exploit existing knowledge or to explore new ideas, and how this effect depends on the ability of the respective individual and on contemporary performance comparisons with direct peers. Further, we also examine how the potential incentivesinduced change in individual behavior affects individual learning and performance after the incentives reduction, and how the impact on performance is moderated by characteristics of the task environment.
The empirical context of our study is how individuals in an e-commerce firm make daily decisions about whether to initiate new ideas/projects or instead exploit existing ones. Our dataset comprises fine-grained data on the individuals in this company, on their direct peers, and on the 75,958 projects the individuals executed from 2011 to 2013. During the sample period, the individuals experienced a marked change in their incentives system -from a performance-based incentives system to a flat-wage structure -enabling us to observe the heterogeneous effect of incentives on individual behavior to engage in exploration or exploitation, and its implication for individual performance.
Our empirical analyses reveal that following the reduction in performance-based incentives, the individuals increase their exploration behavior, consistent with the idea that monetary incentives stifle creativity. Interestingly, we find that this effect is mainly driven by high-ability individuals as, under a flat-wage structure with minimum performance targets, such individuals have greater slack available to engage in exploration of new ideas. We also find that, following the incentives reduction, whenever individuals underperform their peers, the increase in exploration recedes, presumably as competitive pressures to deliver short-term performance dampen the positive effect of reduced performance-based incentives on exploration. Further, we find that exploration performance improves after the incentives change, mediated by the increase in exploration, suggesting mechanisms that facilitate learning in exploratory activities. In addition, the increase in performance after the incentive change was higher for individuals working in more complex task environments, suggesting that some environments require higher levels of exploration than others for higher performance. Finally, while the incentives impact on existing employees can work to the firm's benefit, the reduction in performance incentives could possibly lead to the selection of new employees who consistently underperform existing employees of the firm.
This paper makes several important contributions. First, it contributes to the literature on individuallevel exploration and exploitation (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom et al., 2007 Mom et al., , 2009 Rogan & Mors, 2014; Taylor & Helfat, 2009) , by not only adding evidence that individuals are capable of engaging in both exploration and exploitation and purposefully changing their behavior towards either activity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom et al., 2009 ), but also providing additional insights into how the individual-level behaviors and learning can be influenced by incentives, including the boundary conditions of this effect. Second, and relatedly, we address the repeated calls for understanding the micro-foundations of organizational capabilities and performance (Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Foss, 2011) , by explicating the role that individuals play in exploration and exploitation. Finally, we contribute to the incentives literature related to individual-level innovation (Baumann & Stieglitz, 2014; Ederer & Manso, 2013) , by providing further insight into the heterogeneous effect of incentives on individuals' innovation behavior (Chng et al., 2012; Frank & Obloj, 2014; Obloj & Sengul, 2012) , and the performance implications (Auh & Menguc, 2005; He & Wong, 2004 ) of incentive-induced change in exploration behavior -aspects that are important, but have been underexamined up to date (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010) .
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT
Gibson and Birkinshaw point out that, individuals are at the core of an organization's ability to explore and exploit, as they "use their own judgement as to how they divide their time between alignment-oriented and adaptation-oriented activities (2006: 211) ." While both exploration and exploitation entail unique challenges, the literature on organizational learning suggests that individuals are more prone to exploit existing knowledge rather than to explore new knowledge due to the high chance of failure corresponding to the latter activity (Denrell & March, 2001; March, 1991) . However, March (1991) points out that incentive systems might be an important factor that encourages individuallevel exploration (see p.71 and p.77).
Recent studies on incentives have suggested that the intensity of performance-based incentives could play an important role in an individual's decision to produce innovation. In particular, Baumann and Stieglitz's (2014) simulation model suggests that using low-powered performance-based incentives can be an more effective tool to motivate employees to continuously come up with new ideas and produce innovation. Further, Ederer and Manso's (2013) laboratory experiment found that designing incentives schemes that do not punish individuals (by giving them lower rewards) for early failure, nurtures individuals' attempts to succesfully innovate in the long-term. Building on the above studies and the extant literature, we begin by establishing a baseline expectation about how monetary incentives affect exploration and exploitation at the individual level. In particular, we argue below that stronger performance-based incentives will lead individuals to engage in more exploitation of existing knowledge and stifle exploration, while weaker performance-based incentives will induce individuals to engage in more exploration. The reason for this is twofold.
Firstly, a large stream of literature in psychology and organizational behavior has presented evidence that monetary rewards could shackle creativity. For instance, reward-based incentives have been found to 'crowd-out' intrinsic motivation, which often triggers the creation of novel ideas (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004) . Further, under performance-based pay, outcomes are evaluated on a relatively short term basis. In such cases, individuals will most likely complete a task as quickly and safely as possible and "just take the most beaten path and solve the problem exactly as it has been solved before (Amabile, 1998: 80) ." In addition, Kohn (1999) argues that reward and punishment are two sides of the same coin, and hence rewards could have a punitive effect if one cannot meet performance standards. Such trait of rewards arouses the sense of coercion and fear, which in turn undermines the motivation to take risk and experiment on novel solutions (Kohn, 1993) . Moreover, recent examination of individuals' behavior using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) devices presents that individual exploitation activities involve stronger activations of the reward-related brain regions, implying that reward-based incentives could lead to higher exploitation tendencies triggered even at the neural level (Laureiro-Martínez, Brusoni, Canessa, & Zollo, 2014) .
Secondly, drawing on agency theory, the firm's risk is transferred to the employee when an individual receives a compensation based on performance outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) . A pay-for-performance incentives scheme is a representative example of such risk transfer from the firm to the individual because a dominant portion of individuals' overall compensation becomes dependent on their own performance. Although engaging in exploration could occasionally lead to higher returns, in general, "its returns are uncertain, distant, and often negative (March, 1991: 85) ." Further, searching for novel solutions requires multiple iterations of experimenting which costs significant amounts of time and push employees' rewards further into distance. On the contrary, returns from exploitation are described as "positive, proximate, and predictable (March, 1991: 85) ". As in most cases, one-off rewards from explorations are not large enough and individuals are therefore dependent on a continuing stream of performance contingent rewards. Given that employees in firms are often assumed to be risk-averse when it comes to realizing their final payoff, individuals faced with strong performancebased incentives will moderate their level of exploration in order to produce a predictable and certain stream of income through the exploitation of existing knowledge and ideas. If performance-based incentives are withdrawn, risk-averse employees will no longer need to engage excessively in exploitation just to produce a predictable income stream and can spend more time engaging in exploration. Therefore, taking both arguments together, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Employees engage in more exploration of new ideas following a reduction in
performance-based incentives.
The literature on incentives in strategy suggests that incentives have a non-trivial, heterogeneous impact on different individuals (Chng et al., 2012; Frank & Obloj, 2014; Obloj & Sengul, 2012) .
Consequently, the effect in Hypothesis 1 is likely to be accentuated for some individuals and moderated, if not reversed, for others, depending on certain factors. Prior literature has suggested that personal characteristics such as performance (Cyert & March, 1963) , ability (Smith & Tushman, 2005) or knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) are important moderators that shape individual behavior and individual susceptibility to certain influences (Raisch et al., 2009) . Building on this prior literature, we consider previous performance of an individual as an important factor that moderates the effect of incentives on individual behavior because it is informative about not only individual human capital, but also individual motivational factors. In particular, we argue that the effect in Hypothesis 1 -the increase in exploration behavior due to the reduction in performance-based incentives -will be largely driven by individuals who exhibited high performance under high performance-based incentives for two reasons:
Firstly, high performing individuals are likely to be individuals with high levels of human capital and abilities. A reduction in performance-based pay which entails a shift towards a fixed-wage structure means that individual performance appraisal is more likely to be based on achieving a minimum expected level of performance rather than on the individual's absolute performance achieved. Ceteris paribus, higher ability individuals will naturally find it easier to achieve these minimum performance targets, and will have greater slack available to them in terms of more available time (see Lecuona & Reitzig, 2013) and less mental pressure to perform. Given the reduction in performance-based pay, higher ability individuals will not have incentives to use this slack to engage in exploitation. Instead, they will have incentives to use this slack to engage in exploration of new ideas, as this enhances their knowledge and builds new relationships, thereby augmenting their human and social capital, and ultimately their bargaining power (consistent with Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gardner, 2005) . In this regard, slack has been argued to be instrumental for firms to engage in innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) .
Secondly, individuals who previously exhibited high performance under a performance-based incentives scheme often have a high affinity towards performance-based incentives and are highly motivated by such incentives. Consistent with the notion of sorting (Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989; Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007) , if performance-based incentives are withdrawn, such individuals are likely to leave the firm and move to a company which offers high-powered incentives. Yet, switching employment often takes substantial time. During the transition time, for such individuals, short-term performance maximization is not the main focus any longer. Instead, they have incentives to explore new ideas in order to grow their knowledge and relationship base, thereby enhancing their human and social capital as well as their external bargaining power (consistent with Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Wezel, Cattani, & Pennings, 2006) . Following these arguments, individuals who exhibited high performance under performance-based incentives are more likely to explore more following a reduction in such incentives.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The increase in exploration of employees due to lower performance-based
incentives is greater if they performed better prior to the incentives change.
In addition, social factors, such as peer-to-peer comparisons (Festinger, 1954; Greve, 1998) have been suggested to play an important role in how individuals might respond differently to incentives (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008) . Indeed, following a reduction in performance-based incentives, the peer-related performance comparisons and the relative performance of individuals will play a greater role in the performance evaluation and performance feedback, and we argue that this will shape the impact of incentives on individual's decision to explore or exploit. In particular, in a pay-for-performance incentives system, a relative underperformance to peers is less relevant for individuals' performance evaluation and feedback, as performance is rewarded on an individual and not on a comparison basis.
However, when individual performance-based incentives are removed, the loci of individuals' attention shift. For those individuals who seek to remain in the organization, the chief outcomes of performance appraisal are now promotion and continued employment decisions which are mainly based on relative rather than absolute performance appraisal. As a result, peer-to-peer comparisons become increasingly important and develop a tournament character (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) 3 . As it is well known that only a small percentage of individuals can be promoted in a pyramidal organizational structure, such peer-topeer comparisons become also more important in the perception of individuals themselves and immediate feedback about relative performance (see Ederer, 2010) . If individuals underperform their direct peers, they are under pressure to deliver short-term performance to improve their relative performance ranking in the firm to avoid job loss and to retain their chances of promotion. The resulting pressure to deliver short-term performance and mental pre-occupation will reduce slack both in terms of available time, and concentration/focus. Previous literature has suggested that in such situations individuals revert to less risky and well-known strategies (Sharps, 1999) , or in other words they increase the exploitation of existing knowledge and ideas, and decrease the exploration of new risky ideas. Further, the social facilitation effect frequently documented in the psychology literature (see Aiello & Douthitt, 2001; Uziel, 2007) is consistent with this idea -as peer-comparisons become more important in performance appraisal, individuals will endeavor to deliver a better relative performance in the short-term, and engage in more well-tested known strategies, rather than the exploration of new ideas.
Consequently, we suggest that an individual's increase in exploration behavior following a reduction in performance-based incentives (H1) will recede whenever the individual underperform his or her direct peers.
Hypothesis 3 (H3):
The increase in exploration of employees due to lower performance-based incentives is lower whenever they underperform their direct peers.
Thus far, while we have theorized about the effect of incentives on the "quantity" of exploration, we have so far not hypothesized whether incentives also affect the "quality" or performance of exploration (see also Jenkins Jr. et al., 1998 On the one hand, agency theory would predict that a reduction in performance incentives leads to shirking, and hence, random exploration with adverse performance consequences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Prendergast, 1999) . However, it is unlikely that such behavior is sustainable in the long-term in a context where individual output is observable, particular due to mutual monitoring of peers and the threat of discontinued employment (Kandel & Lazear, 1992) . Rather, we argue that individuals will engage in more purposeful exploration associated with greater performance after the reduction in incentives.
To begin with, individuals will be motivated to build new knowledge and relationships through the exploration of new ideas, thereby enhancing social capital and human capital which they can earn rents on (Castanias & Helfat, 1991) . Further, an individual's marginal cost of purposeful exploration over random exploration is small; particularly, when performance-based incentives are lacking, the opportunity cost of exploration over exploitation is low as well. Finally, as performance incentives no longer 'crowd-out' intrinsic motivations, individuals can expend effort based on interest, curiosity, and a desire to learn (Ryan & Deci, 2000) .
As individuals do more exploration after the change, and as they do so purposefully, they will learn from their more frequent experiences, and on average, achieve greater exploration performance (Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Jain, 2013) . For example, Jain (2013) finds using U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office patent data that an individual's ability to produce innovations increases as knowledge and skills accumulate in a certain technological domain. Such arguments can be applied in the exploration domain as well; by repeatedly engaging in the activity itself, an individual can accumulate knowledge and skills related to where to search and how to develop a new idea into a concrete solution. In addition, Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that deliberate investments in articulating and codifying knowledge gained through experience increase the level of learning. Evidence from neuroscience support this argument, by finding that deliberate modes of search for creative ideas are related to the prefrontal cortex part of the brain, where various information stored in the brain can be effectively combined to produce creative new solutions (Dietrich, 2004) . To summarize, we expect that when performance incentives are removed, individuals engage in more targeted exploration which builds individual knowledge and capabilities of how to explore successfully, and thus increases exploration performance. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Average exploration performance will increase after the reduction in performance-based incentives.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Increased exploration mediates the relationship between reduction in performance-based incentives and exploration performance.
The organizational learning literature suggests that increased learning through exploration is particularly important in certain contexts. So-called the 'hot-stove effect' coined by Denrell and March (2001) , it is observed that individuals are susceptible to readily exploiting decisions that lead to positive outcomes on the first trial, whereas immediately avoiding outcomes that lead to negative outcomes on such trial. The outcome of this propensity is the formation of a systematic bias against new alternatives that require learning, and against alternatives involving risk (Denrell & March, 2001) . Such a bias becomes particularly problematic in contexts in which the probability of failing on a new initiative is inevitably high. To exemplify this, consider the example of a currency trader who only trades one currency pair versus one that trades several currency pairs. Compared to the former trader, the latter could achieve higher performance by exploiting synergies across his trading activities, but also has more challenges to perform well because he or she must understand not only the factors driving variation of returns within each currency pair, but also understand the potential interdependencies across the currency pairs. Hence, provided the same amount of time and resources, the latter trader has a much higher possibility of making an erroneous decision on the first trial of an investment. This would lead the latter trader to avoid such investment type in the future, even though continuous practice and learning through experience could bring higher returns on that type in the long-run.
The literature refers to the complex and ambiguous environmental context in our example as a 'noisy' task environment (Puranam, Stieglitz, Osman, & Pillutla, 2015) , and suggests that 'slower learning rates', or in other words, more exploration of alternatives would lead to higher performance because individuals can further experiment with initially failed new attempts, and learn and improve from those experiences (Denrell & March, 2001) . We argue that when performance-based incentives are reduced, individuals in noisier task environments will exhibit a greater increase in their exploration performance than their colleagues in simpler task environments. Specifically, a performance-based incentives structure creates an atmosphere in which exploitation predominates (see our arguments leading up to H1), as individuals are under pressure to perform in the short-term; such bias towards exploitation will particularly lead individuals exposed to high chances of initial failure to converge on sub-optimal choices which have more certain short-term returns (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991) . As a consequence, the exploration performance of individuals exposed to noisier task environments would have been particularly depressed under a performance-based incentives system.
However, when performance-based incentives are reduced, such individuals will have more time and mental slack to understand their tasks, and hence are more likely to realize the interdependencies between their tasks. This increases the possibility of discovering economically significant synergies between the tasks. Further, more experimentation of various new tasks will increase individuals' absorptive capacity and learning from those tasks (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) , leading to more purposeful and targeted initiatives. In all, the increased benefits of a reduction in performance-based incentives would be higher for individuals in noisier task environments than for those who were already reaching higher levels of performance due to being in simpler task environments. Hence, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The increase in exploration performance due to lower performance incentives is higher when the task environment is noisier.
Our overall theoretical framework is summarized in Figure 1 .
METHODOLOGY Empirical Context
Our empirical context is based on individuals in an e-commerce company selling 'flash-deals' through its online platform (cf. Groupon, Woot!, LivingSocial, and 1SaleAday). Flash deals refer to products that are sold for a relatively short period of time at significantly discounted prices compared to their original retail prices. When a deal expires, the company and the supplier divide the total deal revenue according to a predetermined rate. The revenue that a flash deal generates is representative of the profit the company makes from the respective deal, and hence, it is critical for the company to maximize total deal revenue.
Maximization of revenue requires the careful selection of suppliers and products. Sales employees called 'MDs (merchandisers)' are responsible for such job. By default, MDs take an outbound sales approach, which means that they have to actively search for and persuade potential suppliers that would sell their goods through the company's website. This is because many suppliers are either small-or middle-size enterprises which have never considered e-commerce as a sales channel, or very well-known companies that do not need additional e-commerce sales channels that would have conflicting interests with their existing sales channels. MDs are free to source any type of product they wish as long as the product fits the product categories of the team that the MD is affiliated with. Importantly, MDs have the choice of 'exploiting' deals that they have already sourced and sold before, or 'exploring' new deals of which no prior history exists with regards to sales. MDs post a mix of exploitative and exploratory deals daily.
During the initial periods of our data, MDs were incentivized according to a performance-based incentives scheme. In other words, they received a low amount of baseline salary plus an ex-ante agreedupon percentage of the total profit they generated for the company through their deals. In the new compensation scheme, MDs were paid a much higher baseline salary, but performance-based incentives were mostly taken away. The reason for the change was twofold. First, the company had difficulties recruiting experienced employees from other companies because such employees were receiving stable fixed-wage incomes at their previous companies, and did not want to adapt to a performance-based system in which their salaries would be unpredictable. Second, the pay gap between high-and lowperforming MDs became significantly large, leading to perceptions of inequality. Once the decision was made by management to change the compensation system, the change was implemented over 4 months in 3 waves, each affecting groups of 6, 30, and 11 MDs, respectively. Interestingly, MDs were not notified in advance in which change group they will be included in. Also, except for the first group, MDs were randomly assigned to each change group regardless of their individual characteristics or team affiliation. Finally, the difference in change dates for each group was not purposeful but due to administrative delays in determining new salary amounts.
Data and Sample
The data used to test our hypotheses was provided directly by the company. In particular, we were provided with two databases. The first database included detailed information on deals such as deal name, start-date, duration, number of options, discount rate, sales price, revenue, and information on the MD that executed the deal. This data relates to 98,474 deals done over 30 months from 2011 when the company was founded, to the end of 2013 when the data was collected. The second database included detailed human resource information on all MDs in the company, such as joining date, salary, date of pay scheme change, bonuses before the pay scheme change, team affiliation information, gender, age, and education. We combine the two databases by using the MD identification numbers that are common between them, and only include MDs who have worked for the company for at least 1 month under the old pay system and for at least 1 month under the new pay system to allow a sufficient observation window for behavioral change 4 . The minimum observation per MD in the sample was 103 and the maximum was 545. Our resulting database relates to 75,958 deals done by 47 MDs in 11 product teams over 894 days. Among these deals, 41,666 of them (54.85%) were related to the post-change period.
We conduct our analysis on the daily-level rather than the deal-level as MDs make a choice on a dailybasis of the portfolio of deals they will execute that day. When making this decision, MDs encounter the trade-off between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991 we operationalize propensity of exploration as a continuous variable measured as the ratio of an MD's exploratory deals to the MD's total deals on that day. In defining exploratory deals, we adhere to the literature's tradition of treating exploration as searching for novel products that draw on new knowledge that has not been utilized in the past, and treating exploitation as the reliance on existing knowledge to introduce refined versions of existing products (Danneels & Sethi, 2011; Greve, 2007; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Rogan & Mors, 2014; Stettner & Lavie, 2014 Accordingly, we define exploration as the sales of products, which the focal MD has not engaged in before. In the database, previously sold deals are precisely discernable because the company created an indicator variable for such deals. These repeated deals are referred to as 'encore deals' within the company. Relatedly, exploration performance is measured as the average revenue of non-encore deals per day. To arrive at this measure, the aggregate revenue of non-encore deals posted on a focal day was divided by the total number of such deals posted on that day. For the cases in which a focal deal spanned across multiple days, we assigned the total revenue only to the first day and controlled for deal duration. (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Vroom & Pahl, 1971) . Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used for testing H1-H3. Table 1 about here Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables.
As the dependent variable for H1-H3 is a proportion, there are several challenges to linear regression (Gujarati, 1995; Papke & Wooldridge, 1996) . In order to deal with this issue, we employ a multi-model approach (e.g., Phelps, 2010) . First, we estimate the models using individual fixed-effects OLS panel linear regression with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level (Wooldridge, 2003) . Then, we confirm the robustness of this model using the fractional logit model, which is a model suitable for handling fractional dependent variables introduced by Wooldridge (1996, 2008) . We implement their solution by employing Stata's generalized linear models command, where we specify binomial distribution, logit link function, and robust standard errors (Baum, 2008) . To test H4a-H5, we only use individual fixed-effects OLS panel linear regression with robust standard errors, as our dependent variable for these hypotheses is a continuous variable. Employing individual fixed-effects is a powerful practice that controls for time invariant and unobserved characteristics of MDs that could possibly distort our findings (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) . In addition to including individual fixed-effects, we finally add day of week fixed-effects across all models to control for possible systematic differences in MDs' deal sourcing behavior on particular weekdays.
To test the mediation effect proposed in H4b, we perform a three stage approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Shaver, 2005) . First, we test the relationship between incentives and exploration performance (H4a).
Second, we test if the incentives change affects MDs' propensity toward engaging in exploration (H1).
Finally, we include a variable representing MDs' exploration propensity in the model testing H4 in stage one. Following Shaver (2005), we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach which includes the predicted values of the propensity of exploration variable, instead of the actual values, in stage three (e.g., Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010) . We use such instrumental variable estimation technique to take into account the possibility that the error terms in the equations in stage two and three could be correlated, in which case the regression estimates will be biased and inconsistent (Shaver, 2005) .
RESULTS
The results for regression analyses that test Hypotheses 1 through 3 are presented in Table 3 .
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 
about here -------------------------------------
Model 1 is our baseline model which only includes the control variables. As expected, results show that the more product categories that an MD is exposed to via her peers' deals, the more likely she will explore new deals (p < .01). Also, as predicted, MD tenure had a negative and significant effect on the propensity to explore new deals (p < .01). Finally higher relative performance compared to peers had a positive and significant effect on exploration (p < .01). In Model 2, we examine how the change from performance-based incentives to a fixed-wage scheme affects the MDs' tendency to explore new deals, by adding the incentives change variable (H1). As hypothesized, we find that reduction in performance based incentives has a positive and significant effect on the MD's exploration propensity (p < .01). Figure 2 graphically presents the effect of the incentives change on exploration propensity. As mentioned in the Data and Sample section, the incentives of MDs were changed in three waves (Group A, B, and C).
Consistent with the regression results, the graphs show that at the point of change of incentives, there is a significant jump in exploration, whereas exploitation remains similar or decreases. The increase in exploration and decrease in exploitation is largest for Group A, the first group to be affected.
-------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here -------------------------------------
In Models 3 and 4, we test the interaction effects of previous performance and relative performance predicted in H2 and H3, respectively. Particularly, in Model 3, we investigate the moderating effect of a focal MD's accumulated average deal performance at the change. We predicted that the higher the previous performance of the MD, the more he or she will engage in exploration. The coefficient for this variable is positive and statistically significant (p < .05), thereby providing support for H2. Next, in Model 4, we test the moderating effect of relative performance on exploration behavior after the change.
As hypothesized, the effect is positive and statistically significant (p < .05), providing support for H3.
Finally, in Model 5, we test a full model including all variables. H2 and H3 are consistently supported (p < .05). H1 is not supported; however, the interpretation of the incentives change dummy in this model relates to the main effect when both interaction variables are zero. Hence, this coefficient does not provide a valid test for testing H1. Instead, the most reliable test is shown in Model 2 where no interaction term is included. The results from the fractional logit regression in Models 6-10 also show statistically significant support for all H1-H3, verifying our findings.
The results for regression analyses that test H4a through 5 are presented in Table 4 .
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 
about here -------------------------------------
Model 1 shows the effects of the control variables on exploration performance. At the deal-level, we find that average sales price, average number of options, and average duration of exploratory deals positively affect exploration performance (p ≤ .05). At the individual-level, accumulated experience in exploration had a negative effect on exploration performance (p < .01). In Model 2, we add the incentives change variable to test H4a which argues that the exploration performance will increase after the change.
As predicted, the effect of the incentives change dummy on exploration performance is positive and significant (p < .05). Subsequently, in Model 3 we test H4b which predicts that the association between incentives change and exploration performance will be mediated by the increased levels of exploration engaged in by MDs. Results show that when the mediator (i.e., predicted values of propensity of exploration from H1) is added, the effect of the incentives change becomes insignificant, while the effect of the mediator is positive and statistically significant (p < .05). We also alternatively run a Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) to confirm the mediation effect. Results are supported at the 1% level. We finally test H5 in Model 4. H5 argued that the increase in exploration performance after the incentives change will be amplified for those working in noisy task environments. The positive and significant interaction effect (p < .05) of noisiness of task environment and incentives change provides support for the hypothesis.
Robustness checks
We conduct several robustness checks to reinforce our findings. Firstly, we re-test H1-H3 using an alternative measure for exploration, as exploration could be defined in various forms (Lavie et al., 2010) .
Originally, our dependent variable, propensity of exploration, was measured as the proportion of novel deals among all deals an MD posted on a focal day. However, in our new dependent variable, exploration was defined as the search for new suppliers (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004) . Whereas the original operationalization of exploration focused more on exploration of new products, this alternative measure focuses more on exploration of new relationships. Results are presented in Table 5 .
------------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here -------------------------------------H1 through H3 is largely supported even using this alternative dependent variable. Models 2 through 4 and 7 through 9 represent such results. The main difference from our originally analyses is that H3 is only weakly supported in these analyses (p < .15 in Model 4 and p < .10 in Model 9). H3 hypothesized that MDs increase their level of exploration when they are outperforming their direct peers after the incentives reduction. We believe that the reason why H3 is only weakly supported is related to the relative difficulty of increasing new relationships with suppliers compared to increasing the number of new products to sell.
Our second robustness check addresses the possibility that the increase in the proportion of exploration per day is due to a decrease in exploitation but not an increase in exploration, as would be predicted by the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) or incentives literature (Prendergast, 1999; Shearer, 2004) in the case that performance-based incentives are removed. To test for this, we employ a fixed-effect negative binomial regression model to examine how the absolute number of exploratory and exploitative deals sold on a focal day changes after the pay scheme switch. We use the same control variables and fixed effects as those in Table 3 and run the analyses. Results are presented in Table 6 .
Insert Table 6 
about here -------------------------------------Confirming robustness of our findings, the results show that the number of exploratory deals per day
increases after the change (p < .01) and the number of exploitative deals per day decreases (p < .01). It is interesting to note, however, that the negative coefficient of the number of exploitative deals per day variable is in fact larger than the positive coefficient of the number of exploratory deals per day variable. This result could be interpreted in two ways. First, this might be evidence that MDs are actually slacking in their efforts to sell deals because they are not being paid on a pay-for-performance basis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Prendergast, 1999; Shearer, 2004) . Second, however, this result may be due to the unequal amount of effort needed to increase one exploratory deal versus one exploitative deal. Relatedly, March explains: "The search for new ideas, markets, or relations has less certain outcomes, longer time horizons, and more diffuse effects than does further development of existing ones (1991: 73)". In other words, more arduous effort is needed to execute one additional exploratory deal compared to one extra exploitative deal. Hence, we believe that our second interpretation is more plausible than the first -especially because the teams in our context are relatively small, and hence the likelihood of 'free-riding' is low (Prendergast, 1999) .
Finally, we ran additional robustness checks pertaining to our choice of econometric model. Although we have already confirmed the robustness of our results using both fixed-effect OLS panel linear regression model and fixed-effect fractional logit model, we additionally test our hypotheses using a Tobit model in which we can specify upper and lower bound values for the dependent variable. Results were consistent. Next, we also test our hypotheses at the deal level (instead of the aggregated daily-level) using a fixed-effect logit regression model. Results were consistent. Finally, our fixed-effect OLS model had limited degree-of-freedom because we clustered the standard errors by individual. Therefore, we could not include time fixed-effects such as day or month dummies which would lead to insufficient degree-of-freedom to test the overall model fit. To take account for this, we run a simple OLS model to increase the degree-of-freedom and include the months fixed effects. Results were consistent.
Post-hoc Analyses
As a post-hoc analysis, we investigate whether an actual 'sorting effect' (see Bretz et al., 1989; Cadsby et al., 2007) occurred after the incentives change. That is, we investigated whether different types of employees are attracted to the firm due to the changed incentives structure. In order to do so, we constructed a new sample corresponding to 11,836 deals done by 33 MDs who joined the company after the pay scheme change. We then compared important characteristics of these employees with those of employees in the original sample. Particularly, we compared the means of daily revenue, propensity of exploration, and exploration performance through a t-test. Results are shown in Table 7 .
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 
about here -------------------------------------
Results show that, on average, MDs in the original sample (labeled as Group 1) have higher performance but lower exploration propensity than MDs who joined after the incentives change (labeled as Group 2). Nonetheless, the results of the t-tests should be interpreted with caution because they merely compare the means of each variable without controlling for other confounding effects. Hence, to validate the results of the t-tests further, we run a simple regression model using daily revenue, propensity of exploration, and exploration performance as dependent variables and a group dummy (=1 if Group 2; 0 otherwise) as an independent variable. We also control for MD tenure, which should largely affect all these outcomes. Results of these analyses are presented in Table 8 . Table 8 about here  ------------------------------------- The results of the regression analyses suggest that individuals who joined after the change indeed have lower overall and exploratory performance, but the two groups do not differ in their propensity of exploration. We believe that these results have interesting implications regarding the 'sorting' effect of incentives schemes (Cadsby et al., 2007; Dohmen & Falk, 2011) . While the fixed-wage scheme promotes exploration behavior by removing risk and performance pressures for individuals, individuals who prefer low-risk environments and who have lower abilities could self-select themselves into organizations with such wage scheme. As a consequence, the desired incentives effect which promotes greater levels of lucrative exploration among existing employees who stay at the firm, could be partly offset by the adverse selection of employees with lower abilities who prefer stable, low risk, and low pressure environments.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In his original piece on exploration and exploitation, March points out: "[Although the] fraction of slow learners in an organization is a significant factor in organizational learning…optimizing with respect to the fraction of slow learners [is] problematic if the rates of individual learning are subject to individual control. Since there are no obvious individual incentives for learning slowly in a population in which others are learning rapidly, it may be difficult to arrive at a fraction of slow learners that is optimal from the point of view of the code (1991: 77; italics added)." In this study, we tackle this exact problem of motivating individuals to explore new knowledge more, by applying an incentives lens to individual-level exploration-exploitation. In doing so, we extend the growing stream of studies that investigate the conditions under which individuals engage in both exploration-exploitation activities (Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Mom et al., 2007 Mom et al., , 2009 Rogan & Mors, 2014) . In addition, we contribute to the incentives literature which have examined incentive structures that encourage experimentation and innovation (Baumann & Stieglitz, 2014; Ederer & Manso, 2013) , and which have suggested the need for uncovering the heterogeneous effects of incentives on different individuals (Chng et al., 2012; Frank & Obloj, 2014; Obloj & Sengul, 2012) . Finally, our study contributes to the microfoundations literature that emphasizes the role of individuals in organization capabilities and performance (Barney et al., 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Foss, 2011) .
Based on fine-grained data on behaviors of sales employees at an e-commerce firm who experienced a radical change in their incentives structure, we found that following a withdrawal of performance-based incentives and the introduction of a fixed-wage salary structure, individuals engaged in greater exploration of novel commercial ideas requiring new knowledge. This finding not only corresponds to recent incentives studies suggesting that weakening the link between performance and rewards leads to increased experimentation and search for innovative solutions (Baumann & Stieglitz, 2014; Ederer & Manso, 2013) , but also adds further value by providing empirical evidence of such relationship in a realworld organization context. In particular, our analyses revealed that individuals increased their proportion of searching untested commercial ideas by approximately 11 percent on average, an significant increase given the additional risk and uncertainty they undergo to engage in these activities (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Greve, 2007; March, 1991) . We caution, though, that blinded adoption of incentive schemes that encourages more exploration behavior may not always be optimal because the appropriate level of exploration and exploitation of an organization depends on the organization's mission, dominant logic (Miles & Snow, 1978) , and industry conditions (Jansen et al., 2006; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006) . We suggest that our findings would be most applicable to a similar context in which constant adaptation to a changing environment is crucial, and therefore a boost to high-levels of exploration is required.
Our findings also suggest that the effect of reducing performance-based incentives was particularly large for high-performing individuals under the pay-for-performance system. We have argued that this was due to two reasons. One was due to the increased slack in terms of time and mental resources for exploratory activities that high-performing individuals were 'endowed' with given the new remuneration system (Lecuona & Reitzig, 2013) . Whereas the original performance-based incentives drove individuals to mainly focus on their own performance and to perform as best as they can to maximize their own compensations, the fixed-wage system shifted the locus of interest toward performance of others, steering individuals to perform relatively well compared to their peers. As a result, individuals who were capable to outperform others to a large degree could minimize their efforts in creating a performance gap with average-performing individuals, and rather use that slack to engage in exploratory activities that could help enhance their knowledge and build new relationships (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gardner, 2005) .
The other reason we provided was that high-performers in a pay-for-performance system are often those who have 'sorted' themselves into such incentives system (Cadsby et al., 2007; Dohmen & Falk, 2011) .
Hence, when performance incentives are withdrawn, these individuals would be the ones most likely to leave the company. However, as transitioning to a new job requires sufficient time, it is of best interest for these high-performers to explore new ideas in order to grow their knowledge and relationship base at the expense of their current workplace -activities that enhance their human and social capital, as well as their external bargaining power (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Wezel et al., 2006) .
Another factor we found to moderate the relationship between the compensation scheme change in our empirical setting and the propensity to explore was concurrent relative performance compared to peers. As highlighted before, the withdrawal of performance-based incentives will direct individuals' attention toward their relative performance compared to peers, creating a tournament environment (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Shalley et al., 2004) . As a result, although the fixed-wage salary system encourages more exploration, such activities will recede when their current performance falls below their peers. This is because when individuals are underperforming their peers, those who intend to remain in the organization fears potential job loss, salary cuts, or failure of promotion, and those who intend to leave the company in the mid-and long-term will miss their opportunity to accumulate human and social capital while in the firm, as they are also exposed to being fired from the company. In accordance to these arguments, we find that exploration after the pay scheme change increases when individuals are outperforming their peers and decreases when they are underperforming their peers.
Our results also show that the increased exploration activities after the reduction of performance-based incentives mediated the relationship between the pay scheme change and exploration performance.
By exploration performance, we refer to the financial performance related to the newly experimented commercial ideas. Analyses suggest that when switched to a flat-wage system, individuals not only explore more new ideas, but also perform better in them. In specific, results revealed that average daily exploratory deal revenue increased by approximately 14 percent after the pay scheme change, an economically significant figure. We believe that this is a result of several factors. To begin with, related to our arguments in H2, individuals will be motivated to enhance human and social capital which they can earn rents on (Castanias & Helfat, 1991) . Hence, they will become more deliberate in selecting new opportunities that would provide them future benefits. Further, an individual's marginal cost of engaging in purposeful over random exploration is minimal; particularly, when performance-based incentives are lacking, the opportunity cost of exploration over exploitation are low as well. Therefore, given a fixed amount of time, individuals could now afford to contemplate across various exploration opportunities, and make more riskier but rewarding decisions. In addition, as performance incentives no longer 'crowdout' intrinsic motivations (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Shalley et al., 2004) , individuals can expend effort based on interest, curiosity, and a desire to learn (Ryan & Deci, 2000) . Finally, increased engagement in purposeful exploratory deals will allow individuals to learn more from these experiences, and hence positively affect performance of subsequent endeavors (Darr et al., 1995; Jain, 2013) .
A factor we found to moderate the relationship between the pay scheme change and exploration performance was the 'noisiness' of individuals' task environment (Denrell & March, 2001; Puranam et al., 2015) . By the noisiness of task environment, we refer to the ambiguity and complexity of the environment that an individual performs tasks in. In our empirical context, noise in the task environment originates from the number of different types of product categories that the sales employees are concurrently handling. As the number of product categories that a particular sales employee is handling increases, it becomes the more difficult for the individual to precisely discern the reason for potential success or failure of a particular exploratory deal because each product has different characteristics, lifecycles, and interdependencies with other products. As hypothesized, our results show that exploratory performance is particularly boosted for individuals working in noisier environments. We believe that such results hold because, in general, noisier environments innately require more time for individuals to explore (Puranam et al., 2015) , but performance-based incentives have created an organizational context in which individuals had to forgo opportunities to experiment with choices that could possibly lead to outstanding performance but are risky (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991) . Only when such constraints have been lifted, could individuals in noisy environments could adequately explore opportunities related to higher risk but higher rewards.
While our findings on performance do suggest that exploration performance increases after a reduction in performance-based incentives, such manipulation of incentives should not be interpreted as an indefinite fix for encouraging lucrative exploration within the organization. Although further analysis of our data shows that the effect of the new pay scheme in our empirical context persists for at least six months, prior studies have found that no single organization design can have an everlasting positive effect on organizational performance (Boumgarden, Nickerson, & Zenger, 2012) . In particular, Obloj and Sengul (2012) find that the ability of an incentive regime to induce the intended results diminishes over time, due to the learning of individuals to 'game' or exploit the imposed incentive system. Hence, we suggest that managers should dynamically 'vacilitate' between different incentive designs to achieve intended organizational results (Boumgarden et al., 2012; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002) .
Finally, in further analyses we find interesting implications related to the 'sorting effect' due to the reduction of performance-based incentives (Cadsby et al., 2007; Dohmen & Falk, 2011) . We find suggestive evidence that while the the withdrawal of performance-based incentives promotes exploration behavior by removing risk and immediate performance pressures for individuals, it subsequently attracts individuals who have been seeking for low-risk environments and have lower abilities in general. This raises concerns about the long-term efficacy of switching from pay-for-performance to fixed-wage salary.
However, we suggest that the negative effects of the sorting effect could be attentuated by taking appropriate measures toward the newly hired individuals such as creating an organizational context characterized by an interaction of stretch, discipline, support, and trust (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) , and providing individuals with high-levels of decision-making authority (Mom et al., 2009 ).
Limitations
It is worth noting several limitations of our research. To begin with, our sample is based on a single organization with a limited sample size. Nonetheless, an empirical setting such as ours is unique and rare, an important reason why prior research in this domain have mostly relied on other methods such as simulation models (Baumann & Stieglitz, 2014) or laboratory experiments (Ederer & Manso, 2013) .
Further, the focus on one company enabled us to obtain in-depth insights in a particular setting based on rich quantitative and qualitative data which would be almost impossible to collect and combine across different companies.
Second, our findings pertain to a particular context, in particular, a South Korean e-commerce company, raising concerns about the external validity of our findings. However, it is important to note that while the company we study operates in South Korea, the business model it employs originated from the US and has been replicated globally (i.e., Europe, Asia, and South America). In addition, pay-forperformance and fixed-wage salary schemes are universal compensation options that we expect will respectively have similar effects on individuals regardless of the corporate or national context given that it is employed within a market-based economy. Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted cautiously, and future research could further investigate whether our findings are replicated across different settings.
Finally, while our conceptualization of exploration and exploitation follows the literature's tradition of categorizing such activities based on whether they include an aspect of new knowledge development or not (Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010; Levinthal & March, 1993) , what can be defined as new knowledge development varies by context or level of analysis (Gupta et al., 2006) . In our case, exploration and exploitation activities at the individual-level could be extrapolated to such activities at the organizational-level because individuals generally engage in commercial projects that do not overlap with others in the organizations. Further, while in principle our findings should be applicable to other context where exploration and exploitation occur in different manifestation or forms, we need to be cautious in the interpretation of our findings in contexts that are very different from ours. C. 3 rd wave of incentives change (Group C) 8 We run a piecewise regression using STATA13 to create these graphs. Designating the three incentives change dates (Jan 1, Apr 1, and May 1) as reference points, we regress the average number of exploratory (exploitative) deals per day per MD per group on the deal start dates before and after the incentives change. The -hascons-option is used to prevent STATA to include its own constants since implied constants are included in the model. The predicted values of these regressions are plotted in the graphs using the -twoway-command. 
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